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Abstract
We analyze the endogenous formation of R&D networks, where firms are active in different
product markets and can benefit from R&D spillovers form collaborating firms within or across
different industries. R&D spillovers help firms to introduce process innovations to lower their
production costs. Product innovations introduce an escape-competition effect, through which
firms can enter new markets with fewer competitors. We provide a complete equilibrium char-
acterization in which both, the network of R&D collaborations as well as the market structure,
are endogenously determined. We show that the coevolution of market and network structure
matter for the relationship between competition and innovation. Moreover, our model allows us
to explain differences in the R&D network structures observed across different industries, and
how they are related to different levels of competition in these industries.
Key words: R&D collaborations, networks, competition, innovation
JEL: D85, L24, O33
1. Introduction
R&D collaborations have become a widespread phenomenon especially in technologically inten-
sive industries such as, for instance, the pharmaceutical, chemical and computer industries [cf.
Ahuja, 2000; Lychagin et al., 2010; Powell et al., 2005; Roijakkers and Hagedoorn, 2006]. In this
paper we introduce a tractable (and empirically estimable)1 model of R&D collaboration net-
works in which both, the network structure as well as the market structure are endogenous. Our
framework allows us to understand the formation of these networks, how they are influenced,
and influence competition in different markets. Our model can therefore be used to evaluate
and design industrial policy programs to promote welfare in highly dynamic, R&D intensive
industries [Bulow et al., 1985; Spencer and Brander, 1983].
A key ingredient of our model is an escape-competition effect a` la Aghion et al. [2005, 2001].
The escape-competition effect operates at two different levels in our model: At the level of R&D
collaborations, firms can escape the competition with their rivals by becoming more productive
through reducing their production costs (process innovations). A firm can reduce its marginal
cost of production not only trough investing into R&D, but also through the formation of
R&D collaborations, which allow the firm to benefit from R&D spillovers from its collaboration
partners. At the level of markets, firms can escape competition by developing new products and
entering new markets where the competitive pressure is lower and profits are higher (product
innovations) [Aghion and Howitt, 2009]. We investigate how these two forces interact, and
when one dominates over the other.
Moreover, we analyze the effect of competition on innovation [Aghion et al., 2005], and show
Email address: michael.koenig@econ.uzh.ch (Michael D. Ko¨nig)
1Similar estimation algorithms as in Hsie et al. [2012] can be used to estimate the parameters of our model.
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that it depends on the underlying network structure of R&D collaborating firms. In particular,
we show that for weakly centralized networks, an increase in competition leads to a decrease
in the R&D expenditures per firms, while in strongly centralized networks the opposite holds.
While for strongly centralized networks with a dominant firm an increase in competition leads to
the exit of many small firms that move to other markets (escape competition effect dominates),
in weakly centralized networks an increase in competition does not lead to exit, but reduces
overall R&D expenditures per firm as the returns from innovation are declining (Schumpeterian
effect dominates).
Further, our approach allows us to explain the differences in the R&D network structures
observed across different industries [Rosenkopf and Schilling, 2007]. We investigate how compe-
tition affects the formation of R&D collaborations, as well as the equilibrium market structure.
In particular, we analyze how the different R&D collaboration intensities across different indus-
tries – such as the biotech sector [Aharonson et al., 2008; Powell et al., 2005] compared to other
sectors [Hagedoorn, 2002; Schilling, 2009] – can be explained from different levels of competition
in these industries. Moreover, we show that our model can explain the core-periphery structure
observed in real-world R&D networks [Kitsak et al., 2010], and the differences in the concen-
tration and hierarchical structure of collaborations across various sectors.2 Further, we analyze
how the escape-competition effect shapes the equilibrium distribution of firms across sectors
and affects market entry. This can help us to understand the impact of different market sizes
[Acemoglu et al., 2006; Acemoglu and Linn, 2004; Dubois et al., 2011], competitive pressure, or
differences in the R&D intensity across sectors [Ang, 2008; Rosenkopf and Schilling, 2007], on
R&D collaboration networks.
The introduction of the escape-competition effect also has important welfare implications.
Whereas in previous models such as Ko¨nig et al. [2014b] an increase in competition always leads
to a reduction in output (cf. Schumpeterian effect, see e.g. Aghion et al. [2014]), R&D and
welfare, here firms can escape competition by entering niche markets where they can expand
their production, and perform higher levels of R&D. Our analysis thus provides new insights
into the relationship between innovation and competition in R&D intensive industries in which
R&D collaborations are commonly observed. Our model can further be used to identify the
optimal network and/or market structure, and evaluate potential inefficiencies that arise in the
decentralized equilibrium due to the presence of network externalities.
The paper is organized as follows. Firms’ profits and the spillovers from collaborations are
introduced in Section 2. Section 3 analyzes the equilibrium production levels in an exogenous
network. Section 4 then introduces the industry and network dynamics and provides a complete
equilibrium characterization. Further, Section 5 introduces an extension of the model with
multiproduct firms. Finally, Section 6 concludes. Appendix A provides additional details to
some network definitions used in the paper, while all proofs can be found in Appendix B.
2. Firms’ Profits and Production
Firms can reduce their production costs by investing in R&D as well as by establishing an
R&D collaboration with another firm. The amount of this cost reduction depends on the R&D
effort ei of firm i and the R&D efforts of the firms that are collaborating with i, i.e., R&D
collaboration partners.3 Given the effort level ei ∈ R+, the marginal cost ci of firm i is given
2E.g. Kitsak et al. [2010] observe that the life sciences industry network consists of a strong core periphery
structure, while this structure is less pronounced in the information and communication technology sectors.
3See also Kamien et al. [1992] for a similar model in which firms unilaterally choose their R&D effort levels.
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by4
ci = ci − ei − ϕ
n∑
j=1
aijej, (1)
The network G is captured by A, which is a symmetric n × n adjacency matrix. Its element
aij ∈ {0, 1} indicates if there exists a link between nodes i and j such that aij = 1 if there
is a link (i, j) and zero otherwise. In the context of our model, aij = 1 if firms i and j set
up an R&D collaboration (0 otherwise) and aii = 0. In Equation (1), the total cost reduction
for firm i stems from its own research effort ei and the research knowledge of other firms, i.e.,
knowledge spillovers, which is captured by the term
∑n
j=1 aijej , where ϕ ≥ 0 is the marginal
cost reduction due to neighbor’s effort. We assume that R&D effort is costly. In particular, the
cost of R&D effort is an increasing function, exhibits decreasing returns, and is given by 12e
2
i .
Firm i’s profit is then given by
pii = (pi − ci)qi −
1
2
e2i − ζdi − γi, (2)
where ζdi and γi are fixed costs for firm i (see below), and the inverse demand for the good qi
produced by firm i in market Mm, m = 1, . . . ,M is given by
pi = αi − qi − ρ
∑
j∈Mm,j 6=i
qj . (3)
Inserting marginal cost from Equation (1) and inverse demand from Equation (3) into Equation
(18) gives
pii = (α¯i − qi − ρ
∑
j∈Mm,j 6=i
qj − ci + ei + ϕ
n∑
j=1
aijej)qi −
1
2
e2i − ζdi − γi
= (α¯i − ci)qi − q
2
i − ρ
n∑
j=1
bijqiqj + qiei + ϕqi
n∑
j=1
aijej −
1
2
e2i − ζdi − γi, (4)
where bij ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether firms i and j operate in the same market or not, and let B
be the n× n matrix whose ij-th element is bij . In Equation (4), we have that
∑
j∈Mm,j 6=i
qj =∑n
j=1 bijqj since bij = 1 if i, j ∈ Mm and i 6= j, and bij = 0 otherwise, i.e. if i and j do not
belong to the same market. In other words, the matrix B captures which firms operate in the
same market and which firms do not. Take row i in matrix B, for example. If there are only
zeros, this means that firm i is alone in its market. If there is a 1 corresponding to column j,
this means that firms i and j operate in the same market (or sector). Note that the matrix B
can always be represented in block diagonal form. We denote by B(n,m) the class of zero-one
block diagonal n× n matrices with m blocks, so that B ∈ B(n,m).
The FOC of profits with respect to R&D effort ei of firm i is given by
∂pii
∂ei
= qi − ei = 0,
4This generalizes earlier studies such as that by D’Aspremont and Jacquemin [1988] where spillovers are
assumed to take place between all firms in the industry and no distinction between collaborating and non-
collaborating firms is made.
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so that we obtain
ei = qi. (5)
Inserting the relationship ei = qi and denoting by ηi ≡ α¯i − ci, we can write Equation (4) as
[cf. Ballester et al., 2006]
pii = ηiqi − q
2
i︸ ︷︷ ︸
own concavity
−ρ
n∑
j 6=i
bijqiqj
︸ ︷︷ ︸
global substitutability
+ ϕ
n∑
j=1
aijqiqj
︸ ︷︷ ︸
local complementarity
−ζdi − γi︸ ︷︷ ︸
fixed cost
. (6)
We assume that the fixed cost can be decomposed in a network dependent part, ζdi and an
industry/market dependent part, γi. The network dependent part captures collaboration costs,
where di counts the number of collaborations of firm i. The industry/market dependent cost
γi = γ
m
1{i∈Mm} captures fixed market entry costs and barriers to entry. Indeed, γ
m is the
entry cost to market m. We then can write ζi+γi = ζdi+
∑M
m=1 γ
m
1{i∈Mm}, and firm i’s profit
can be written as
pii = ηiqi − q
2
i − ρ
n∑
j 6=i
bijqiqj + ϕ
n∑
j=1
aijqiqj − ζdi −
M∑
m=1
γm1{i∈Mm}. (7)
Note that the profit function introduced in Equation (7) admits a potential function [cf. Mon-
derer and Shapley, 1996], which not only accounts for quantity adjustments but also for the
linking and market entry strategies.
Proposition 1. Then the profit function of Equation (7) admits a potential game with potential
function Φ: Rn+ × {0, 1}
n×n × B(n,m)→ R given by
Φ(q,A,B) =
n∑
i=1
(ηqi−νq
2
i )−
ρ
2
n∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
qiqj+
ϕ
2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
aijqiqj−ζm−
n∑
i=1
M∑
m=1
γm1{i∈Mm}, (8)
where m is the number of links in G.
The Nash equilibria are then the states maximizing the potential. The potential function
will be useful when analyzing the stationary states of a dynamic process in which the output
levels of the firms, their collaborations and the market structure are endogenous as discussed
in Appendix 4 (see in particular Proposition 2).
Note that in the absence of collaborations, our framework can be interpreted as a public
goods game in which the effort levels of linked agents in a network are strategic substitutes.
This generalizes the models analyzed in Bramoulle´ and Kranton [2007]; Bramoulle´ et al. [2014]
to an endogenous network.
3. (Quasi) Equilibrium Characterization
For simplicity we consider only the case of firms with a single product. Moreover, in the following
we assume that the network G changes only slowly relative to the rate at which firms adjust
their production levels. We then can assume that firms play a (quasi) Nash equilibrium in their
output levels for a given network G. The first order conditions of Equation (4) with respect to
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output qi are given by
∂pii
∂qi
= ηi − 2qi − ρ
n∑
j=1
bijqj + ei + ϕ
n∑
j=1
aijej = 0.
Next, inserting equilibrium effort from Equation (5) and rearranging terms gives
qi = ηi − ρ
n∑
j=1
bijqj + ϕ
n∑
j=1
aijqj. (9)
In matrix-vector notation this can be written as
q = η − ρBq+ ϕAq,
or, equivalently,
(In + ρB− ϕA)q = η.
When the matrix In−ρB+ϕA is invertible,
5 equilibrium quantities can be explicitly computed
as
q = (In − ρB+ ϕA)
−1
η. (10)
Further, one can show that equilibrium profits are given by pii =
1
2q
2
i . In the special case of
a single market (i.e., M = 1) and homogeneous firms, ηi = η for all i = 1, . . . , n, the Nash
equilibrium output levels from Equation (10) can be simplified to
q =
η
1− ρ+ ρ‖bu (G,ϕ) ‖1
b (G,ϕ) . (11)
The vector b (G,ϕ) ≡ (In−ϕA)
−1u ,with u being a vector of ones, in Equation (11) corresponds
to a well known measure for the centrality of the nodes in a network called the Katz-Bonacich
centrality [Bonacich, 1987]. More details and a precise definition of this centrality measure can
be found in Appendix A.
4. Industry and Network Dynamics
In this section we introduce a stochastic dynamic process in which both, the network structure
and the market structure are endogenously formed, based on the profit maximizing decisions of
firms with whom to collaborate, or which market to enter. The opportunities for change arrive
as a Poisson process [cf. Sandholm, 2010], similar to Calvo models of pricing [Calvo, 1983].
To capture the fact that the establishment of an R&D collaboration is fraught with ambiguity
and uncertainty [cf. Czarnitzki et al., 2015; Czarnitzki and Toole, 2013; Kelly et al., 2002], and
there is uncertainty in the profitability of market entry, we will introduce noise in this decision
process. The precise definition of the dynamics of quantity adjustment, network evolution and
endogenous competition structure is given in the following:
Definition 1. The evolution of the population of firms, the collaborations between them and the
market structure are characterized by a sequence of states (ωt)t∈R+ , ωt ∈ Ω, where each state
ωt = (qt,At,Bt) consists of a vector of firms’ output levels qt ∈ Q
n, a network of collaborations
represented by the adjacency matrix At ∈ {0, 1}
n×n, where aij,t = 1 if firms i and j collaborate,
5For sufficient conditions guaranteeing invertibility see Ko¨nig et al. [2014b].
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and aij,t = 0 otherwise, and a competition matrix Bt ∈ B(n,m),
6 where bij,t = 1 if firms i and
j operate in the same market at time t and bij,t = 0 otherwise. We assume that firms choose
quantities from a bounded set Q. In a short time interval [t, t+∆t), t ∈ R+, one of the following
events happens:
Output adjustment At rate χ ≥ 0 a firm i ∈ N is selected at random and given a revision
opportunity of its current output. When firm i receives such a revision opportunity, the
probability to choose the output is governed by a multinomial logistic function with choice
set Q and parameter ϑ [cf. Anderson et al., 2001; McFadden, 1976], so that the probability
that we observe a switch by firm i to an output level in the infinitesimal interval [q, q+dq]
is given by
P (ωt+∆t = (q ≤ qi ≤ q + dq,q−it,At,Bt)|ωt = (qt,At,Bt))
= χ
eϑpii(q,q−it,At,Bt)dq∫
Q e
ϑpii(q′,q−it,At,Bt)dq′
∆t+ o(∆t). (12)
Link formation With rate λ > 0 a pair of firms ij which is not already connected receives an
opportunity to form a link. The formation of a link depends on the marginal payoff the
firms receive from the link plus an additive pairwise i.i.d. error term εij,t. The probability
that link ij is created is then given by
P (ωt+∆t = (qt,At + ij,Bt)|ωt−1 = (q,At,Bt))
= λ P ({pii(qt,At + ij,Bt)− pii(qt,At,Bt) + εij,t > 0}
∩{pij(qt,At + ij,Bt)− pij(qt,At,Bt) + εij,t > 0}) ∆t+ o(∆t),
where we have denoted by At + ij the adjacency matrix obtained from At by adding the
link ij. Using the fact that pii(qt,At + ij,Bt) − pii(qt,At,Bt) = pij(qt,At + ij,Bt) −
pij(qt,At,Bt) = Φ(qt,At + ij,Bt) − Φ(qt,At,Bt), and assuming that the error term is
i.i. logistically distributed,7 we obtain for the creation of the link ij
P (ωt+∆t = (qt,At + ij,Bt)|ωt = (qt,At,Bt))
= λ P (−εij,t < Φ(qt,At + ij,Bt)− Φ(qt,At,Bt))∆t+ o(∆t)
= λ
eϑΦ(qt,At+ij,Bt)
eϑΦ(qt,At+ij) + eϑΦ(qt,At,Bt)
∆t+ o(∆t), (13)
Link removal With rate ξ > 0 a pair of connected firms ij receives an opportunity to terminate
their connection. The link is removed if at least one firm finds this profitable. The marginal
payoffs from removing the link ij are perturbed by an additive pairwise i.i.d. error term
6Recall that B(n,m) denotes the class of zero-one block diagonal n × n matrices with m blocks and zero
diagonal, so that Bt ∈ B(n,m) for all t ≥ 0.
7Let z be i.i. logistically distributed with mean 0 and scale parameter ϑ, i.e. Fz(x) =
eϑx
1+eϑx
. Consider the
random variable ε = g(z) = −z. Since g is monotonic decreasing, and z is a continuous random variable, the
distribution of ε is given by Fε(y) = 1− Fz(g
−1(y)) = e
ϑy
1+eϑy
.
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εij,t. The probability that the link ij is removed is then given by
P (ωt+∆t = (qt,At − ij,Bt)|ωt = (q,At,Bt))
= ξ P ({pii(qt,At − ij,Bt)− pii(qt,At,Bt) + εij,t > 0}
∪{pij(qt,At − ij,Bt)− pij(qt,At,Bt) + εij,t > 0}) ∆t+ o(∆t),
where we have denoted by At − ij the adjacency matrix obtained from At by removing
the link ij. Using the fact that pii(qt,At − ij,Bt)− pii(qt,At,Bt) = pij(qt,At − ij,Bt)−
pij(qt,At,Bt) = Φ(qt,At − ij,Bt) − Φ(qt,At,Bt), and assuming that the error term is
i.i. logistically distributed we obtain
P (ωt+∆t = (qt,At − ij,Bt)|ωt = (qt,At,Bt))
= ξ P (−εij,t < Φ(qt,At − ij,Bt)− Φ(qt,At,Bt))∆t+ o(∆t)
= ξ
eϑΦ(qt,At−ij,Bt)
eϑΦ(qt,At−ij) + eϑΦ(qt,At,Bt)
∆t+ o(∆t).
Product innovation With rate κ > 0 a firm makes a product innovation. When a firm has
made a product innovation it adopts the new product (and enters a new market) only if its
marginal profits plus an additive i.i.d. error term are positive. The probability that firm
i enters a new market and the competition structure changes from Bt to B
′ is then given
by8
P
(
ωt+∆t = (qt,At,B
′)|ωt = (qt,At,Bt)
)
= κP
(
pii(qt,At,B
′)− pii(qt,At,Bt) + εit > 0
)
∆t+ o(∆t).
Using the fact that pii(qt,At,B
′) − pii(qt,At,Bt) = Φ(qt,At,B
′) − Φ(qt,At,Bt), and
assuming that the error term is i.i. logistically distributed we obtain
P
(
ωt+∆t = (qt,At,B
′)|ωt = (qt,At,Bt)
)
= κ P
(
−εi,t < Φ(qt,At,B
′)− Φ(qt,At,Bt)
)
∆t+ o(∆t)
= κ
eϑΦ(qt,At,B
′)
eϑΦ(qt,At,B′) + eϑΦ(qt,At,Bt)
∆t+ o(∆t).
In the above definition we assume that product innovation follows a Poisson process with
parameter κ [cf. Aghion and Howitt, 1992, 2009; Aghion et al., 1998]. The probability that a firm
successfully innovates and discovers a new product in a short time interval is then proportional
to κ. However, a firm only adopts a new product when its profits with the new product exceed
its profits with the old product, and this depends on the degree of competition in the different
markets. Moreover, observe that product innovation incorporates an escape-competition effect
[cf. Aghion et al., 2005, 2001; Aghion and Howitt, 2009], where firms can enter new markets
with fewer competitors. The resulting endogeneity of the competition matrix B extends the
analysis in Ko¨nig et al. [2014b], where an increase in competition always leads to a welfare
reduction by lowering the output of firms, while here an increase in competition can lead firms
to enter niche markets where they can produce more than when the market structure is fixed.
8When a firm i makes a product innovation, it can enter a new market and a transition occurs from bij,t = 0
to bij,t+∆t = 1 for all firms j currently active in that new market. We assume that if a firm adopts a new product
it abandons the previous product, so that bik,t = 1 to bik,t+∆t = 0 for all firms k that were competitors in the
previous market.
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B0 Bt
Figure 1: Stationary market structure: (Left panel) The initial block-diagonal competition matrix B0 in which
firms are randomly assigned to sectors with increasing weights across sectors. (Right panel) The stationary
competition matrix Bt exhibiting a uniform distribution of firms across sectors. This is consistent with the
theoretical prediction of Proposition 3, where it is shown that in the symmetric case the stochastically stable
state is characterized by a homogeneous market structure in which the number of firms across sectors is equalized.
With the potential function Φ(q,A,B) of Proposition 1 we then can state the following
proposition.
Proposition 2. The dynamic process (ωt)t∈R+ introduced in Definition 1 induces an irre-
ducible and aperiodic Markov chain with a unique stationary distribution µϑ : Qn ×{0, 1}n×n ×
B(n,m) → [0, 1] such that limt→∞ P(ωt = (q,A,B)|ω0 = (q0,A0,B0)) = µ
ϑ(q,A,B). When
the shocks ε are independent and identically exponentially distributed with parameter ϑ ≥ 0,
then the probability measure µϑ is given by
µϑ(q,A,B) =
eϑ(Φ(q,A,B)−m ln(
ξ
λ))∑
A′∈{0,1}n×n
∑
B′∈B(n,m)
∑
q′∈Qn e
ϑ(Φ(q′,A′,B′)−m′ ln( ξλ))
, (14)
with the potential function Φ(q,A,B) given in Equation (8).
The next proposition characterizes the networks in the support of the stationary distribution
as having a core periphery structure similar to what we find in the data [see also Kitsak et al.,
2010; Rosenkopf and Schilling, 2007]. In particular, it shows that with decreasing values of the
noise parameterized by ϑ the stochastically stable networks are nested split graphs [Ko¨nig et al.,
2014a].
Proposition 3. The states in the support of the stationary distribution µϑ of Proposition 2
have the following properties:
(i) The probability of observing a network G ∈ Gn, respectively, an adjacency matrix A, given
an output distribution q ∈ Qn and market structure B ∈ B(n,m) is determined by the
conditional distribution
µϑ(A|q,B) =
µϑ(q,A,B)
µϑ(q,B)
=
n∏
i<j
eϑaij(ρqiqj−ζ)
1 + eϑ(ρqiqj−ζ)
, (15)
which is equivalent to the probability of observing an inhomogeneous random graph with
link probability
pϑ(qi, qj) =
eϑ(ρqiqj−ζ)
1 + eϑ(ρqiqj−ζ)
. (16)
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(ii) Moreover, in the limit of ϑ→∞, the stochastically stable network G with µ∗(q,A,B) > 0
is a nested split graph in which firms i and j are linked if and only if ρqiqj > ζ.
(iii) Further, in the stochastically stable state, as ϑ → ∞, we obtain a homogeneous market
structure in which the number of firms across sectors is equalized.
Typical networks in the support of the stationary distribution with varying values of ρ ∈
{0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1} are shown Figure 2 assuming a single market. We observe that with increasing
values of ρ the network density decreases and networks become more centralized on a few hub
firms. That is, with increasing levels of competition network centralization increases. This is
consistent with the core-periphery structure predicted by Proposition 3.
Next, we consider the case of multiple sectors. Figure 1 shows the transition of the market
structure from an initial block-diagonal competition matrix in which firms are randomly assigned
to sectors with increasing weights across sectors to the stationary competition matrix exhibiting
a uniform distribution of firms across sectors. This shows that in the homogeneous case, where
firms are identical and the degree of substitutability between products (ρ) is the same across
sectors, the potential maximizing configuration is the one in which all markets have the same
size. This is consistent with the theoretical prediction of Proposition 3, where it is shown that
in the symmetric case the stochastically stable state is characterized by a homogeneous market
structure in which the number of firms across sectors is equalized.
As an alternative example with heterogeneous levels of competition in each sector (i.e.
different values of ρm across sectors indexed by m) consider a situation with only two markets,
M1 and M2. Figure 3 shows the asymptotic average output q¯ produced together with the
fraction of firms in market one for increasing values of the competition parameter ρ and varying
values of the noise parameter ϑ with n = 15 firms, η = 15 and φ = ν = λ = ξ = χ = 1. The
underlying economy consists of two sectors, M1 and M1, where the degree of substitutability
ρ in M1 is gradually decreased from one to zero, while in M2 it is fixed at one. We observe
that q¯ is increasing with decreasing ρ, but this effect is much higher when firms can escape
competition in the second sector by entering the first sector.
A similar escape competition effect is illustrated in Figure 4. It illustrates the initial and final
market structure with a heterogeneous distribution of ρ across 10 sectors gradually increasing
over the range ρ ∈ {0.0182, 0.0364, 0.0545, 0.0727, 0.0909, 0.1091, 0.1273, 0.1455, 0.1636, 0.1818}.
While initially firms are homogeneously distributed across sectors, over time they migrate to
sectors with lower ρ, that is, less competition.
5. An Extension with Multi-Product Firms
In this section we allow firms to produce more than one product and thus be active in different
markets [cf. e.g. Bernard et al., 2011; Bulow et al., 1985]. Let qik ∈ R
nm
+ be the quantity sold
by firm i to market Mk. Then the price in market Mk is given by
pk = αk − qik − ρ
∑
j∈Mk\{i}
qjk.
Let eik be the R&D effort of firm i for products sold to market Mk. Then the marginal cost of
producing in market Mk is given by
cik = c¯ik − eik − ϕ
n∑
j=1
aijejk1{j∈Mk}, (17)
9
ρ = 0.25 ρ = 0.5
ρ = 0.75 ρ = 1
Figure 2: Typical networks in the support of the stationary distribution for ϑ = 0.1 and varying values of
ρ ∈ {0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1}. We observe that with increasing values of ρ the network density decreases and networks
become more centralized on a few hub firms. This is consistent with the core-periphery structure predicted by
Proposition 3.
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Figure 3: Escape competition effect: Asymptotic average output q¯ produced (left and middle panel) together
with the fraction of firms in market one (right panel) for increasing values of the competition parameter ρ and
varying values of the noise parameter ϑ with n = 15 firms, η = 15 and φ = ν = λ = ξ = χ = 1. The underlying
economy consists of two sectors,M1 andM1, where the degree of substitutability ρ inM1 is gradually decreased
from one to zero, while in M2 it is fixed at one. The left panel shows the asymptotic value of q¯ when firms
cannot change sectors (setting κ = 0), while the middle and right panels allow for market entry (κ = 10). We
observe that q¯ is increasing with decreasing ρ, but this effect is much higher when firms can escape competition
in the second sector by entering the first sector (see the middle and right panel).
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Figure 4: Escape competition effect: The initial and final market structure, represented by B0 and Bt, re-
spectively, for a heterogeneous distribution of ρ across 10 sectors gradually increasing over the range ρ ∈
{0.0182, 0.0364, 0.0545, 0.0727, 0.0909, 0.1091, 0.1273, 0.1455, 0.1636, 0.1818}. While initially firms are homoge-
neously distributed across sectors, over time they migrate to sectors with lower ρ, that is, less competition.
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The profit of firm i is given by
pii =
M∑
k=1
1{i∈Mk}
(
(pk − cik)qik −
1
2
e2ik − γik
)
− ζi, (18)
where ζi and γik are fixed costs for firm i (see below). Inserting inverse demand and marginal
cost yields
pii =
M∑
k=1
1{i∈Mk}



αk − qik − ρ ∑
j∈Mm,j 6=i
qjk − c¯ik + eik + ϕ
n∑
j=1
aijejk1{j∈Mk}

 qik
−
1
2
e2ik − γik
)
− ζdi
=
M∑
k=1
1{i∈Mk}

(αk − c¯ik)qik − q2ik − ρ ∑
j∈Mm,j 6=i
qjkqik + eikqik + ϕ
n∑
j=1
aijejk1{j∈Mk}qik
−
1
2
e2ik − γik
)
− ζdi. (19)
The FOC w.r.t. eik is given by
∂pii
∂eik
= 1{i∈Mk} (qik − eik) = 0,
so that when i ∈Mk we obtain
eik = qik. (20)
Inserting into profits yields
pii =
M∑
k=1
1{i∈Mk}
(
(αk − c¯ik)qik −
1
2
q2ik − γik
)
− ρ
M∑
k=1
n∑
j 6=i
1{i,j∈Mk}qikqjk
+ ϕ
M∑
k=1
n∑
j=1
aij1{i,j∈Mk}qikqjk − ζdi
=
M∑
k=1
1{i∈Mk}
(
(αk − c¯ik)qik −
1
2
q2ik − γik
)
− ρ
M∑
k=1
n∑
j 6=i
bij,kqikqjk
+ ϕ
M∑
k=1
n∑
j=1
aij,kqikqjk − ζdi, (21)
where bij,k = 1{i∈Mk}1{j∈Mk} ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether both firms i and j are active in
marketMk and aij,k = aijbij,k ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether these firms have also formed an R&D
collaboration. We denote by B ∈ {0, 1}nm the nm×nm dimensional matrix with elements bij,k
and similarly by A ∈ {0, 1}nm the nm× nm dimensional matrix with elements aij,k.
Note that the profit function introduced in Equation (21) admits a potential function [cf.
Monderer and Shapley, 1996], which not only accounts for quantity adjustments but also for the
linking and market entry strategies, allowing firms to be active in several markets simultaneously.
Proposition 4. The the profit function of Equation (21) admits a potential function Φ: Rnm+ ×
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{0, 1}nm × {0, 1}nm → R given by
Φ(q,A,B) =
n∑
i=1
M∑
k=1
1{i∈Mk}
(
(αk − c¯ik)qik −
1
2
q2ik − γik
)
−
ρ
2
n∑
i=1
M∑
k=1
1{i,j∈Mk}
∑
j 6=i
qikqjk +
ϕ
2
n∑
i=1
M∑
k=1
1{i,j∈Mk}
n∑
j=1
aijqikqjk − ζm
=
n∑
i=1
M∑
k=1
1{i∈Mk}
(
(αk − c¯ik)qik −
1
2
q2ik − γik
)
−
ρ
2
n∑
i=1
M∑
k=1
∑
j 6=i
bij,kqikqjk +
ϕ
2
n∑
i=1
M∑
k=1
n∑
j=1
aij,kqikqjk − ζm, (22)
where m is the number of links in G.
Similar to Proposition 2 with the potential function Φ(q,A,B) of Proposition 4 we are
then able to characterize the stationary state of the stochastic process of quantity adjustment,
market entry, exit, and link formation.
Proposition 5. The dynamic process (ωt)t∈R+ induces an irreducible and aperiodic Markov
chain with a unique stationary distribution µϑ : Qn × {0, 1}n×n × B(n,m) → [0, 1] such that
limt→∞ P(ωt = (q,A,B)|ω0 = (q0,A0,B0)) = µ
ϑ(q,A,B). When the shocks ε are independent
and identically exponentially distributed with parameter ϑ ≥ 0, then the probability measure µϑ
is given by
µϑ(q,A,B) =
eϑ(Φ(q,A,B)−m ln(
ξ
λ))∑
A′∈{0,1}n×n
∑
B′∈B(n,m)
∑
q′∈Qn e
ϑ(Φ(q′,A′,B′)−m′ ln( ξλ))
, (23)
with the potential function Φ(q,A,B) given in Equation (22).
6. Conclusion
In this paper we have introduced a model of multimarket, multiproduct competition among
R&D collaborating firms. Through the formation of collaborations firms can benefit from
technology spillovers to reduce their production costs (process innovations), while product in-
novations allow firms to enter novel markets with potentially fewer competitors. We derive a
complete equilibrium characterization of the economy in which both, the market as well as the
network structure are endogenously determined.
The paper could be extended along several dimensions. Similar to Hsie et al. [2012], one
could estimate the model using maximum likelihood methods based on the equilibrium char-
acterization of the model. These estimates could then be used to investigate the empirical
differences in the R&D network structures observed across different industries [Rosenkopf and
Schilling, 2007]. Moreover, similar to Ballester et al. [2006]; Hsie et al. [2012] one could perform
a dynamic key player analysis considering the long run implications of firm exit when both, the
network as well as the market structure react to the exit of a firm.
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Appendix
A. Bonacich Centrality
We introduce a network measure capturing the centrality of a firm in the network due to
Bonacich [1987]. Let A be the symmetric n × n adjacency matrix of the network G and λPF
its largest real eigenvalue. The matrix M(G,φ) = (I−φA)−1 exists and is non-negative if and
only if φ < 1/λPF.
9 Then
M(G,φ) =
∞∑
k=0
φkAk. (24)
The Bonacich centrality vector is given by
bu(G,φ) =M(G,φ) · u, (25)
where u = (1, . . . , 1)⊤. We can write the Bonacich centrality vector as
bu(G,φ) =
∞∑
k=0
φkAk · u = (I− φA)−1 · u.
For the components bu,i(G,φ), i = 1, . . . , n, we get
bu,i(G,φ) =
∞∑
k=0
φk(Ak · u)i =
∞∑
k=0
φk
n∑
j=1
(
Ak
)
ij
. (26)
Because
∑n
j=1
(
Ak
)
ij
counts the number of all walks of length k in G starting from i, bu,i(G,φ)
is the number of all walks in G starting from i, where the walks of length k are weighted by
their geometrically decaying factor φk.
B. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. The potential Φ(q,A,B) of Equation (8), which is given by
Φ(q,A,B) =
n∑
i=1
(ηqi − νq
2
i )−
ρ
2
n∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
qiqj +
ϕ
2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
aijqiqj − ζm−
n∑
i=1
M∑
m=1
γm1{i∈Mm},
has the property that
Φ(q,A+ ij,B) − Φ(q,A,B) = ϕqiqj − ζ = pii(q,A+ ij,B) − pii(q,A,B). (27)
The case of link removal is analogous. From the properties of pii(q,A,B) it also follows that
Φ(q′i,q−i,A,B)−Φ(qi,q−i,A,B) = pii(q
′
i,q−i,A,B)−pii(qi,q−i,A,B). Next, consider product
innovation. Recall that bij ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether firms i and j are competitors in the
same product market. Consider a change of firm i leaving market m and entering market m′.
Let the associated competition matrices be given by B = (bij)1≤i,j,≤n and B
′ = (b′ij)1≤i,j,≤n,
respectively. Note that the matrix B can always be represented in block diagonal form. We
denote by B(n,m) the class of zero-one block diagonal n× n matrices with m blocks and zero
9The proof can be found e.g. in Debreu and Herstein [1953].
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diagonal, so that B ∈ B(n,m). Furthermore, note that the matrix B′ is obtained from the
matrix B by a simultaneous row and column exchange, so that also the matrix B′ can always
be represented in block-diagonal form, that is B′ ∈ B(n,m). The marginal change in the profit
of firm i from leaving market m and entering market m′ is given by
pii(q,A,B
′)− pii(q,A,B) = ρqi

 ∑
j∈Mm′\{i}
qj −
∑
j∈Mm\{i}
qj

− (γm − γm′)
= ρqi
n∑
j=1
(bij − b
′
ij)qj − (γ
m − γm
′
).
Note that for the potential function we get
Φ(q,A,B′)− Φ(q,A,B) = ρqi
n∑
j=1
(b′ij − bij)qj − (γ
m − γm
′
) = pii(q,A,B
′)− pii(q,A,B).
This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2. In the following we show that the stationary distribution µϑ(ω) in Equa-
tion (23) satisfies the detailed balance condition
µϑ(ω)p(ω′|ω) = µϑ(ω′)p(ω|ω′) (28)
where p(ω′|ω) denotes the transition rate of the Markov chain from state ω to ω′. Observe
that the detailed balance condition is trivially satisfied if ω′ and ω differ in more than one link
or more than one quantity level. Hence, we consider only the case of link creation A′ = A+ ij
(and removal A′ = A− ij), an adjustment in quantity q′i 6= qi for some i ∈ N or a change in the
competition matrix B to B′. For the case of link creation with a transition from ω = (q,A,B)
to ω′ = (q,A+ ij,B) we can write the detailed balance condition as follows
1
Zθ
eϑ(Φ(q,A,B)−m ln(
ξ
λ))
eϑΦ(q,A+ij,B)
eϑΦ(q,A+ij,B) + eϑΦ(q,A,B)
λ
=
1
Zθ
eϑ(Φ(q,A+ij,B)−(m+1) ln(
ξ
λ))
eϑΦ(q,A,B)
eϑΦ(q,A,B) + eϑΦ(q,A+ij,B)
ξ.
This equality is trivially satisfied. A similar argument holds for the removal of a link with a
transition from ω = (q,A,B) to ω′ = (q,A− ij,B) where the detailed balance condition reads
1
Zθ
eϑ(Φ(q,A,B)−m ln(
ξ
λ))
eϑΦ(q,A−ij,B)
eϑΦ(q,A−ij,B) + eϑΦ(q,A,B)
ξ
=
1
Zθ
eϑ(Φ(q,A+ij,B)−(m−1) ln(
ξ
λ))
eϑΦ(q,A,B)
eϑΦ(q,A,B) + eϑΦ(q,A−ij,B)
λ.
For a change in the output level with a transition from ω = (qi,q−i,A,B) to ω
′ = (q′i,q−i,A,B)
17
we get for the detailed balance condition
1
Zθ
eϑ(Φ(qi,q−i,A,B)−m ln(
ξ
λ))
eϑpii(q
′
i,q−i,A,B)dq∫
Q e
ϑpii(q′,q−i,A,B)dq′
χ
=
1
Zθ
eϑ(Φ(q
′
i,q−i,A,B)−m ln(
ξ
λ))
eϑpii(qi,q−i,A,B)dq∫
Q e
ϑpii(q′,q−i,A,B)dq′
χ.
This can be written as eϑ(Φ(qi,q−i,A,B)−Φ(q
′
i,q−i,A,B)) = eϑ(pii(qi,q−i,A,B)−pii(q
′
i,q−i,A,B)), which is
satisfied since we have for the potential Φ(qi,q−i,A,B)−Φ(q
′
i,q−i,A,B) = pii(qi,q−i,A,B)−
pii(q
′
i,q−i,A,B). Further, for a transition from B ∈ B(n,m) to B
′ ∈ B(n,m) we have that
1
Zθ
eϑ(Φ(q,A,B)−m ln(
ξ
λ))
eϑΦ(q,A,B
′)
eϑΦ(q,A,B′) + eϑΦ(q,A,B)
κ
=
1
Zθ
eϑ(Φ(q,A,B
′)−m ln( ξλ))
eϑΦ(q,A,B)
eϑΦ(q,A,B) + eϑΦ(q,A,B
′)
κ.
Hence, the probability measure µϑ(ω) satisfies a detailed balance condition and therefore is the
stationary distribution of the Markov chain with transition rates p(ω′|ω).
Proof of Proposition 3. We first prove part (i) of the proposition. Observe that the potential
can be written as
Φ(q,A,B) =
n∑
i=1
(η − νqi) qi︸ ︷︷ ︸
ψ(q)
−
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=i+1
bijρqiqj +
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=i+1
aij (ϕqiqj − ζ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
σij
. (29)
We then have that
eϑΦ(q,A,B) = eϑψ(q)e−ϑ
∑n
i<j bijρqiqjeϑ
∑n
i<j aijσij ,
where only the second factor in the above expression is network dependent. We then can use
the fact that ∑
A∈{0,1}n×n
eϑ
∑n
i<j aijσij =
∏
i<j
(
1 + eϑσij
)
,
to obtain ∑
A∈{0,1}n×n
eϑΦ(q,A,B) = eϑψ(q)e−ϑ
∑n
i<j bijρqiqj
∑
A∈{0,1}n×n
eϑ
∑n
i<j aijσij
= eϑψ(q)e−ϑ
∑n
i<j bijρqiqj
∏
i<j
(
1 + eϑσij
)
= eϑψ(q)e−ϑ
∑n
i<j bijρqiqj
∏
i<j
(
1 + eϑσij
)
=
n∏
i=1
eϑ(η−νqi)qie−ϑ
∑n
i<j bijρqiqj
∏
i<j
(
1 + eϑϕqiqj−ζ
)
. (30)
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We can use Equation (30) to compute the marginal distribution
µϑ(q,B) =
1
Zϑ
∑
A∈{0,1}n×n
eϑΦ(q,G)
=
1
Z ϑn
n∏
i=1
eϑ(η−νqi)qie−ϑ
∑n
i<j bijρqiqj
∏
i<j
(
1 + eϑ(ϕqiqj−ζ)
)
. (31)
With the marginal distribution from Equation (31) we can write the conditional distribution as
µϑ(A|q,B) =
µϑ(q,A,B)
µϑ(q,B)
=
eϑΦ(q,A,B)∏n
i=1 e
ϑ(η−νqi)qie−ϑ
∑n
i<j bijρqiqj
∏
i<j
(
1 + eϑ(ϕqiqj−ζ)
)
=
eϑψ(q)e−ϑ
∑n
i<j bijρqiqjeϑ
∑n
i<j aijσij∏n
i=1 e
ϑ(η−νqi)qie−ϑ
∑n
i<j bijρqiqj
∏
i<j
(
1 + eϑ(ϕqiqj−ζ)
)
=
eϑ
∑n
i<j aij(ϕqiqj−ζ)∏
i<j
(
1 + eϑ(ϕqiqj−ζ)
)
=
∏
i<j
eϑaij (ϕqiqj−ζ)
1 + eϑ(ϕqiqj−ζ)
=
∏
i<j
(
eϑ(ρqiqj−ζ)
1 + eϑ(ρqiqj−ζ)
)aij (
1−
eϑ(ρqiqj−ζ)
1 + eϑ(ρqiqj−ζ)
)1−aij
=
∏
i<j
p
aij
ij (1− pij)
1−aij .
Hence, we obtain the likelihood of an inhomogeneous random graph for the collaboration net-
work G, respectively, A, with link probability
pij =
eϑ(ρqiqj−ζ)
1 + eϑ(ρqiqj−ζ)
, (32)
We next show that the networks G in the support of the stationary distribution µϑ(q,A,B) in
the limit of vanishing noise ϑ →∞ are nested split graphs. A graph G is a nested split graph
if for every node i ∈ N there exist a weight wi and a threshold τ such that vertices i and j are
linked if and only if wi + wj ≥ τ [Mahadev and Peled, 1995]. In the following we denote by
Hn ⊂ Gn the set of nested split graphs with n nodes.
Next, we consider part (ii) of the proposition. In the limit ϑ → ∞ the linking probability
in Equation (32) becomes limϑ→∞ p
ϑ(qi, qj) = 1{ρqiqj>ζ}, and the conditional probability of the
network G can be written as limϑ→∞ µ
ϑ(A|q,B) =
∏n
i<j 1
aij
{ρqiqj>ζ}
1
1−aij
{ρqiqj<ζ}
. Assume that G
is a stochastically stable network, that is, we must have that limϑ→∞ µ
ϑ(q,A,B) > 0. Since,
µϑ(q,A,B) = µϑ(A|q,B)µϑ(q,B) this implies that limϑ→∞ µ
ϑ(A|q,B) > 0. It follows that
ρqiqj > ζ for all aij = 1 and ρqiqj < ζ for all aij = 0. We then define the weights wi ≡ log qi,
wj ≡ log qj and a threshold τ ≡ log ζ − log ρ, and conclude that G ∈ H
n is a nested split graph.
Finally, we prove part (iii) of the proposition. We next consider the part of the stationary dis-
tribution µϑ(q,A,B) that depends on the market structure, that is the part that is proportional
to e−ϑ
∑n
i<j bijρqiqj . Since all firms are identical, and due to symmetry, the stochastically stable
state (when ϑ→∞) will feature an identical output level q across firms, and we can write this
as e−ϑ
∑n
i<j bijρq
2
= e−ϑρq
2
∑M
m=1 (
|Mm|
2 ) = e−ϑρq
2(n2)
∑M
m=1 xm, where |Mm| is the number of firms
19
in sector m and we have denoted by xm ≡
1
(n2)
(
|Mm|
2
)
= |Mm|(|Mm|−1)
n(n−1) ≈
(
|Mm|
n
)2
= y2m and
ym is the fraction of firms in market Mm. Hence, we can write e
−ϑ
∑n
i<j bijρq
2
= e−c
∑M
m=1 y
2
m =
e−cpi(y)
−1
with some constant c, and pi(y) is the participation ratio. The participation ratio pi(y)
measures the number of elements of y which are dominant. We have that 1 ≤ pi(y) ≤ n, where
a value of pi(y) = n corresponds to a fully homogenous case, while pi(y) = 1 corresponds to a
fully concentrated case. As the stochastically stable states maximize the potential, this implies
that in the stochastically stable state we have a fully homogeneous market structure in which
the number of firms across sectors is equalized.
Proof of Proposition 4. The potential Φ(q,A,B) of Equation (22), given by
Φ(q,A,B) =
n∑
i=1
M∑
k=1
1{i∈Mk}
(
(αk − c¯ik)qik −
1
2
q2ik − γik
)
−
ρ
2
n∑
i=1
M∑
k=1
1{i,j∈Mk}
∑
j 6=i
qikqjk +
ϕ
2
n∑
i=1
M∑
k=1
1{i,j∈Mk}
n∑
j=1
aijqikqjk − ζm
=
n∑
i=1
M∑
k=1
1{i∈Mk}
(
(αk − c¯ik)qik −
1
2
q2ik − γik
)
−
ρ
2
n∑
i=1
M∑
k=1
∑
j 6=i
bij,kqikqjk +
ϕ
2
n∑
i=1
M∑
k=1
n∑
j=1
aij,kqikqjk − ζm,
has the property that
Φ(q,A+ ij,B) − Φ(q,A,B) = ϕ
M∑
k=1
aij,kqikqjk − ζ = pii(q,A+ ij,B) − pii(q,A,B), (33)
where we have used the fact that the profit function in Equation (21) is given by
pii =
M∑
k=1
1{i∈Mk}
(
(αk − c¯ik)qik −
1
2
q2ik − γik
)
− ρ
M∑
k=1
n∑
j 6=i
bij,kqikqjk + ϕ
M∑
k=1
n∑
j=1
aij,kqikqjk − ζi.
The case of link removal is analogous. In the case of quantity adjustment (within the same sec-
tor), from the properties of pii(q,A,B) it also follows that Φ(q
′
ik,q−ik,A,B)−Φ(qik,q−ik,A,B) =
pii(q
′
ik,q−ik,A,B) − pii(qik,q−ik,A,B).
Next, consider a product innovation. Recall that bij,k ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether firms i
and j are competitors in the same product market Mk. Consider a change of firm i leaving
market m and entering market m′. Let the associated competition matrices be given by B =
(bij,k)1≤i,j,≤n,1≤k≤M and B
′ = (b′ij,k)1≤i,j,≤n,1≤k≤M , respectively. Note that the matrix B
′ is
obtained from the matrix B by a simultaneous row and column exchange. The marginal change
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in the profit of firm i from leaving market m and entering market m′ is given by
pii(q,A,B
′)− pii(q,A,B) = ρqim

 ∑
j∈Mm′\{i}
qjm′ −
∑
j∈Mm\{i}
qjm

− (γm − γm′)
+ ϕqim

 ∑
j∈Mm′\{i}
aijqjm′ −
∑
j∈Mm\{i}
aijqjm


= ρqim
n∑
j=1
M∑
k=1
(bij,k − b
′
ij,k)qjk − (γ
m − γm
′
)
+ ϕqim
n∑
j=1
M∑
k=1
aij(bij,k − b
′
ij,k)qjk.
Note that for the potential function we get
Φ(q,A,B′)− Φ(q,A,B) = ρqim
n∑
j=1
M∑
k=1
(b′ij,k − bij,k)qjk − (γ
m − γm
′
) + ϕqim
n∑
j=1
M∑
k=1
aij(b
′
ij,k − bij,k)qjk
= pii(q,A,B
′)− pii(q,A,B).
This completes the proof.
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